Articles

Ambassador Shahid M.Amin

Presently, there is a great deal of criticism of Pakistan in the US Congress, official circles and the media on the basis of the allegation that Pakistan had supported the Taliban clandestinely, while ostensibly supporting the US/NATO in the War on Terror, launched in 2001. Pakistan is, in effect, accused of playing a double game viz. While being a US ally, it has been supporting the Taliban in multiple ways, like giving them sanctuaries, training them and offering them intelligence support, etc. Some circles are claiming that since 2004, the Taliban fought against and eventually won the war against the US/NATO forces, mainly due to the role played by Pakistan. Warnings are being issued by US government circles that they are reappraising bilateral relations with Pakistan, and there have been implicit threats of imposing of sanctions against Pakistan. In what looks like a sign of displeasure, President Biden has so far not spoken on phone with Prime Minister Imran Khan, unlike the past history of US Presidents getting in touch with the Pakistan President/Prime Minister immediately after taking office.

It is unfortunate that many circles in the US have shown a reckless disregard of the truth about the real reasons for the US/NATO military and political failure in Afghanistan. Even worse, there has been a serious misreading of history about the course of US-Pakistan relations in the last seventy years. No doubt, the US is currently in a state of shock and frustration over its failure in Afghanistan, but making judgements on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations and outright misconceptions will not serve any purpose. There is need for a careful and dispassionate analysis of the recent events in Afghanistan and the history ofUS-Pakistan relations.

 

Historical Review:

No doubt, inter-state relations are based on a mutuality of national interests. This applies also to the 70-years long relationship that has existed between USA and Pakistan. Unfortunately, a perception has grown in the US that, over the years, it has given substantial financial and military aid to Pakistan, but has got nothing/little in return from Pakistan which, it is further alleged, has at times worked to harm US interests. This impression is not supported by the historical evidence. In the 1950s, the two countries first got close together because the US was looking for allies on the periphery of the Communist bloc, in pursuit of its policy of “containment” of the Soviet Union. Pakistan decided to become a US ally and joined two US sponsored security pacts CENTO and SEATO and was the most allied partner of USA, and supported it on most issues, during the period 1954-1965 Pakistan’s motive was to secure military, economic and diplomatic support from the USA in order to counter the grave security threat from its regional rival, India, which was several times bigger in size and resources. Pakistan did receive substantial US economic and military aid but, when the 1st India-Pakistan War broke out in 1965, the US cut off its military aid and diplomatic support of Pakistan. The perception in Pakistan was that it had been let down by its US ally. Many also noted that Pakistan had paid a heavy price for its alliance with the US, because the other Super Power, the Soviet Union, had thrown its full weight behind India since 1954 and used its veto in the UN Security Council to frustrate implementation of its Resolutions on Kashmir, a vital issue for Pakistan. The alliance with the US was also not popular because the Pakistani public opinion saw the US as the principal supporter of Israel, the occupier of Jerusalem, a very sensitive Islamic issue. Many Pakistanis also favored non-alignment in foreign policy.

During the 1960s, the US kept showing displeasure with Pakistan for seeking good relations with China. It did not realize that Pakistan’s strategic reason was that it already had bad relations with India, a large neighbor, and could not afford to have unfriendly relations also with China, another large neighbor. Ironically, in 1971, Pakistan played a key role in the normalization of US relations with China. This was a huge strategic gain for the US in global politics and strengthened its hands vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, its principal enemy in the Cold War. President Nixon profusely thanked Pakistan for its role in US-China reconciliation.

In the 1980s, Pakistan joined the US and NATO and became the principal conduit for military and other support of the Afghan Mujahidin who were fighting the Soviet Union. Pakistan was deeply concerned that the Soviet Red Army had reached the Khyber Pass and Pakistan could be the next Soviet target. On the other hand, the US considered the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan as a strategic gain for Moscow in the Cold War: it was now in a striking distance to reach the warm waters, which was an old Russian dream. Thus, a mutuality of interests brought Pakistan and the US together and close cooperation took place.

The Afghan Mujahidin eventually succeeded in the long and bitter war that resulted in death of thousands of Afghans. The Soviets were forced to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989. It was a major Soviet defeat in the Cold War and probably contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union itself in 1991. Without Pakistan’s key support, the Soviets would have prevailed in Afghanistan and would have made it a satellite country, if not annexed it outright as the 16th Soviet republic. This was a huge geostrategic gain for the US and the West. Pakistan had helped in a big way to make it possible.

During the Afghan Jihad, Pakistan did receive billions of dollars in US military and economic aid. But, in the process, Pakistan also took formidable risks and was constantly facing threats of grave consequences from the Soviet Union, a Super Power next door. Moscow sought to harm Pakistan by drawing even closer to India and also encouraged subversion in Pakistan by the Communist regime in Kabul. Indeed, Pakistan paid a heavy price for supporting the Afghan Jihad due to the proliferation of arms in the country, the spread of narcotics, and the rise of Islamist extremists and terrorists, who have ever since sought to destabilize Pakistan.

What did the US do after the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan? It simply washed off its hands from Afghanistan and left Pakistan to face the after math. The same Afghan Mujahidin, who were trained and armed by the US during the Jihad, and were feted in the White House by President Reagan, became a security threat to the US/West. Usama bin Laden and Afghan Arabs’ were part of the Afghan Jihad and were seen as US allies. They later emerged as a formidable security threat for the USA, as proved by 9/11. The Afghan Jihad had radicalized and militarized these extremists. But, apart from USA, Pakistan would also suffer at the hands of these terrorists.

After 9/11, the US was determined to invade Afghanistan. Pakistan was seen as the only viable access route for the US invasion. President Bush more or less forced Pakistan to become a partner in the War on Terror by threatening: “Either you are with us or against us.” It needs to be noted that no Pakistani was involved in 9/11. The Taliban regime in Kabul had done nothing against Pakistan. Left on its own, Pakistan would have remained out of the war. But it was left with no alternative but to allow US/NATO forces to operate via Pakistani territory for 20 years. The perception grew in Pakistan that it had been forced to join a war that was not its own war.

Pakistan also played an active part in the War on Terror by launching military operations against the Islamist terrorists in its tribal areas. But Pakistan’s support for the US led to severe retaliation from the pro-Taliban supporters, namely, the TTP (Tehreek Taliban Pakistan) and Al-Qaeda who unleashed a reign of terror in Pakistan. Over 70,000 Pakistanis lost their lives and financial losses are estimated to be over $150 billion. The US gave economic and military aid to Pakistan (around $20 billion) and also reimbursed it under the Coalition Support Fund to compensate Pakistan’s expenditure in military operations against the terrorists.

It is noteworthy, on comparison, that when the US wanted to use a transit route through Turkey, for its invasion of Iraq in 2003, it had offered $40 billion to Turkey. The aid to Pakistan for the use of its territory for 20 years was far less. It is astonishing that an impression has grown in the US that it has squandered away big money in Pakistan since 9/11 and received nothing in return. The opposite has been the case. Pakistan allowed the strategic transit route through its territory, without which the US could not have fought in Afghanistan. Moreover, Pakistan paid a very heavy price for its support of the US since 9/11 in terms of lives lost and financial losses due to activities of TTP and other terrorists

Pakistan's alleged support for the Taliban

Any realistic analysis would show that the Taliban fought and won the war in Afghanistan due to their own popularity and strategy. Firstly, being mainly Pakhtun themselves, they were able to generate support from the large Pakhtun population in Afghanistan. Secondly, their Islamic ideology, how ever harsh it might seem to the rest of the world, has appeal in the traditional Afghan village culture. Thirdly, the Taliban were seen by many Afghans as fighting for liberation from foreign occupation. The West-sponsored Kabul regime, set up in 2002, was seen as a foreign puppet, which was also regarded as corrupt and inefficient. Fourthly, Afghanistan is very suitable for guerilla warfare, as was previously found by the British in the 19th century and the Soviets in the 20th century. The question is why did the Kabul regime armed forces collapse so suddenly? For about 20 years, they had been trained and armed by the US/NATO. But in the end, most of them refused to fight and surrendered, sometimes without a shot being fired. There could be several reasons for this collapse. Firstly, the Kabul regime forces had pro-Taliban elements, as shown by their frequent desertions over the years. Secondly, the Kabul forces were psychologically much too dependent on US/NATO military support and believed that the US would retain a military presence in Afghanistan. When they realized belatedly that the US was making a total withdrawal, they lost heart. Thirdly, almost 40 years of constant warfare had produced war-weariness. The growing rise of the Taliban since 2004 would achieve a snowballing effect in the final stages, when the impression grew that the Taliban were on a winning course and shedding of more blood would not stop them. Finally, the US made a strategic mistake by issuing a definitive deadline for military withdrawal. This definitely emboldened, the Taliban and demoralized the Kabul regime forces. The conclusion has to be that the Taliban won the war due to a combination of internal reasons and defective US policies.   In any event, let us take the accusation that it was Pakistan’s support for the Taliban that led to their victory. No concrete proof has ever been produced of the allegation that there were safe sanctuaries for Taliban in Pakistan. The US has all the technology and intelligence resources and could have identified any specific sanctuary in Pakistan, had there been one. As for allegations of Pakistani military help to Taliban in the fighting inside Afghanistan, no Pakistani soldier was ever captured, dead or alive, in Afghanistan. This applies equally to the more recent capture of Panjshir valley by the Taliban with the alleged, but totally unproven, military support by Pakistan. Mere allegations without concrete proof take us nowhere.

There is another accusation that since some Taliban leaders and their families have been living in Pakistan, this “proves’ that Pakistan has been a supporter of the Taliban. But non-Taliban Afghan leaders have also lived in Pakistan, like ex-President Karzai and ex President Rabbani. The obvious reason is that Afghanistan has long been in a state of war, whereas Pakistan is a relatively safe country. Plus, it has all the conveniences of life, including good medical treatment and education facilities for children. Hence, many Afghans, Pakhtun and Ron-Pakhtun, have bought properties in Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan has always had a kind of open border with Afghanistan because the same tribes live on both sides of the border. This makes it very difficult to control movement across the border. There are other concrete reasons that rule out any active military role by Pakistan in support of the Taliban. Firstly, Pakistan has its hands full in trying to prevent aggression by India, a foe which is several times bigger than Pakistan in size and resources. Secondly, Pakistan’s economy is in a poor shape and Pakistan simply does not have physical resources to get involved in a protracted military adventure in its neighborhood. Finally, the lesson of history shows that it has never been possible for Pakistan to bring about a change of regime in Afghanistan. If it could, why did it not manage to change many unfriendly regimes in Kabul who have been at odds with Pakistan right from its independence in 1947?

The critics of Pakistan also point to the killing in 2011 of Usama bin Laden in Abbottabad, and ask how he could be hiding close to Pakistan’s premier military training academy. They argue that this was, surely, due to connivance by some Pakistani military circles. But the objective reality is that UBL had declared a Jihad against the Musharraf regime in Pakistan due to its support for the US war in Afghanistan. His group Al-Qaeda was involved in serious acts of terrorism in Pakistan. Why should Pakistan provide a safe sanctuary to UBL? It makes no sense. However, Pakistan can be blamed for a serious failure of intelligence. But this has happened in the case of other countries as well. The US was unaware of the 9/11 plot till the end. In 1941, the US had no clue that Japan was about to bomb Pearl Harbor. In 2003, the US/British intelligence mistakenly claimed that Saddan Hussin was in possession of WMDs, leading to the US invasion of Iraq. This intelligence turned out to be untrue and the US has been condemned by many for forwarding a false justification for invading Iraq in  2003.

Conclusion

The US is understandably frustrated by its military defeat in Afghanistan. But it is no use making Pakistan a scapegoat for this defeat. This would be no more than a case of self-deception. It is in the US interest to make an objective assessment of the reasons for failure in Afghanistan so as to draw the right conclusions that will help avoid any such mistakes in the future.

The US needs to realize that Pakistan has been an important ally for decades. While the US has given it substantial military and economic aid, but, over the years, Pakistan has also played a strategically important role that has helped US global interests. In other words, the US-Pakistan alliance since 1954 has not been a one-way traffic. Pakistan did get US aid but it also helped USA on critical global issues. Moreover, by becoming a US ally, it has also suffered in many ways and paid a heavy price for its friendship with USA. The bottom line is that, despite some periodic disappointments, the US-Pakistan relationship has been mutually advantageous.

Neither the US nor any other country can overlook that Pakistan is a nuclear power and has a key geostrategic location. It will continue to be a factor in global politics in the present and the future, notably in the context of developments in Afghanistan. Befriending Pakistan remains very much in the US interest. It is also in the national interest of Pakistan to maintain a friendly relationship with the US, which is the sole Super Power and wields great influence.

Ambassador Abdul basit President ,PICSS,Islamabad

It is said that “diplomacy is the art of the possible”. Diplomacy is also defined as “the art of accepting the feasible in order to advance the desirable”. In the context of Pakistan-India relations, this exciting and intricate art seems to have yielded far less than the general public expectations on both sides of the border. The international community also appears to have been losing interest in the seemingly intractable bilateral disputes. This a bad augury. Mutual hostility in a nuclear environment cannot be left to either indefinite disengage or risk prone improvidence.

Cycle of Stalemates

It was a great privilege for me to have served in New Delhi as Pakistan High Commissioner for over three years, that is, from March 2014 to August 2017. I was genuinely enthusiastic to contribute meaningfully. The first and foremost challenge was how to put the bilateral engagement process itself on an irreversible trajectory. The cycle of moving from a stalemate to a stalemate had to come to an end.

The first meeting between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New  Delhi on 27 May 2014 was full of bonhomie.They agreed to resume the dialogue process. Accordingly, it was decided that the Indian Foreign Secretary, Sujatha Singh, would visit Pakistan on 25 August to talk about talks. The proposed visit, however, could not take place. The new Indian government found my meetings with the Hurriyat leadership prior to the visit as offensive and unacceptable. Foreign Secretary Singh telephoned me on 18 August to convey that Pakistan should either interact with New Delhi or the “Kashmiri separatists”. She also warned me that if I went ahead with my meetings, she would be constrained to cancel her visit to Pakistan. To me the Indian demarche, which immediately found its way to the Indian media, was unreasonable, especially when India had never in the past made this an either-or issue. However, there was no question I would resign to India’s ultimatum. The Indian media lost no time in blaming me for the cancellation of Singh’s visit. I was, however, convinced that India would itself reach out to Pakistan after the elections in Kashmir in which for the first time the BJP won 25 seats and became the junior partner in the coalition government with the People’s Democratic Party. India’s new Foreign Secretary, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, using the SAARC yatra cover, visited Pakistan in early March 2015. The two countries were thus gradually moving towards breaking the logjam.

The two prime ministers met at Ufa, Russia (10 July 2015) on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit meeting. They agreed on two parallel streams of talks. One led by the National Security Advisors to discuss issues related to terrorism and the other one by the Foreign Secretaries to talk on issues ranging from Kashmir to peace and security. It was decided that the Pakistan’s National Security Advisor (NSA) would visit New Delhi during the second half of the next month to resume the engagement process.

That visit also could not materialize, for India refused to allow the Pakistan NSA to meet the Hurriyat leadership at a reception to be hosted by me. Thus, the two sides had again hit a deadlock. It was the Heart of Asia Conference on Afghanistan held in Islamabad in December that provided the opportunity to break the impasse. Earlier, the two prime ministers had a brief informal encounter in Paris at the climate change summit, which was followed by a meeting of the two NSAs in Bangkok on 6 December 2015. Modi also surprised everyone by making a brief stopover in Lahore on 25 December on his way from Kabul to New Delhi to greet Sharif on the wedding of his grand-daughter. 

While preparations were in hand for Foreign Secretary Jaishankar’s visit to Pakistan on 15 January 2016, the attack on the Pathankot airbase in the Indian Punjab on 2 January once again put the bilateral engagement process at risk. Jaishankar’s visit was postponed with mutual consultations. India then kept on prevaricating and finally linked the visit to progress on the Pathankot investigations.

Indubitably, 2016 was a difficult year. The Pathankot attack; the arrest of Commander Kulbhushan Jadhav by Pakistan in March; months-long protests in Kashmir following the martyr of Burhan Wani on 8 July; the Uri attack on 18 September in which 19 Indian soldiers were killed; the Indian claim of carrying out surgical strikes on the Pakistan side of the Line of Control; and the postponement of the 19th SAARC summit to be held in Islamabad in November over Indian boycott, left both sides in the vortex of uncertainty.

Hopes engendered by the new government in Pakistan under Prime Minister Imran Khan also could not last long. The Pulwama attack on 14 February 2019 and then the Balakot episode witnessed another round of high tensions Even Pakistan’s overture to return the captured Indian Wing Commander, Abhinandan Varthaman. within 48 hours did not help break the ice. In fact, worse was not yet to come.

On 5 August 2019, India stripped Jammu and Kashmir of its special status through constitutional amendments. Pakistan reacted sharply, downgrading the diplomatic relations, halting the bilateral trade and closing its airspace for Indian commercial flights. While the last one has now been done away with, the two hostile countries are yet to find a way out of the present cul-de-sac. Pakistan is insisting that the status quo as existed on 4 August should be restored. For India, that is non-negotiable.

Ceasefire Agreement

Meanwhile, a backchannel was established between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence and India’s National Security Advisor. After a year or so long engagement, the two sides, to the surprise of many, reached an agreement on 25 February 2021 on observing ceasefire along the Line of Control (LOC). An informal ceasefire understanding did exist since November 2003 but was being violated routinely, killing many Kashmiris living along the LOC.

It may be mentioned that Pakistan had proposed in September 2015 to formalize the 2003 understanding but India never responded. Perhaps, India’s positive response now was prompted by the Sino-Indian clashes in the eastern Ladakh region last year in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed. It makes perfect military sense for India to avert a two-front situation. However, there was no point for Pakistan to let the two-front pressure on India go, given what India did apropos the occupied Jammu and Kashmir.

Interestingly, the joint statement signed by the Directors General (Military Operations) from both sides went beyond the ceasefire. The two DGMOs also “agreed to address each other’s core issues and concerns which have propensity to disturb peace and lead to violence”. It was never made clear who would address “each other’s core issues and concerns”, and how. Needless to say these matters were beyond the bailiwick of DGMOs. 

While the ceasefire is holding barring a few minor incidents, the return of the Taliban to power in Kabul on 15 August 2021, has visibly rattled India and vitiated the bilateral atmosphere. On 12 September, Pakistan presented a well-documented dossier, detailing India’s continuing grisly human rights violations in Kashmir. The dossier also refers to five Daesh camps being run by India. It seems the backchannel that was established over two years ago has outlived its utility. We are seeing the two countries returning to high-voltage rhetoric.

Way Forward

Bilateralism, as India insists, has largely failed. Islamabad and New Delhi have not been able to show any concrete progress on either Kashmir or even less complicated issues, such as, Siachen and Sir Creek. Even the confidence-building measures (CBMs), painstakingly worked out during the last two decades, are gradually falling apart. For instance, trade and tourism across the LoC have totally stopped. There are no cricketing ties. And the visa regime, that was substantially relaxed in 2012, is back to unhelpful stringency. So much so there was no exchange of traditional greetings by the two premiers on the independence day of the two countries this year.

Pakistan-India relations appear to have reached the point where they need external help to facilitate bilateral engagement and meaningful talks. We know that some role was played by the UAE that resulted in the ceasefire agreement. India’s aversion to third party mediation notwithstanding, realistically speaking the two countries have lost so much mutual trust during the recent years that recovering the ground on their own looks discouragingly difficult if not impossible.

Much hinges on India. It is India that has added more complications to the bilateral relations by its revocation of Kashmir’s special status. This was not only in breach of its own constitution and the 1972 Shimla Agreement but also in defiance of the 4th April 2018 judgement of the Indian Supreme Court ruling that Article 370 had “acquired permanent status through years of existence, making its abrogation impossible.”

To break the current gridlock, India cannot escape taking some hard decisions. This time round, Pakistan may not be willing to have talks before India takes some concrete steps upfront on Kashmir. Some obvious are as follows:

First, India should release all the Hurriyat leaders either in jail or under house arrest. They must be allowed to travel abroad freely, including Pakistan. Similarly, all political prisoners in Kashmir should also be freed forthwith.

Second, India must lift all the black laws currently in place in Kashmir. These laws are anti-democratic as they give absolute powers to security personnel to even kill innocent people in the garb of security with impunity. Many international human rights organizations, as well as the UN Human Rights Commissioner have spoken against these draconian laws.

Third, India must allow a UN Human Rights Commissioner team to visit Kashmir as recommended in his 2018 and 2019 reports. 

Fourth, India must rescind over three million domiciles that have been issued to Indians making them eligible to settle down and purchase property in Kashmir. This is nothing but to change Kashmir’s demography and turn it into a Hindu-majority state.

Fifth, the Indian Supreme Court must start hearing of the petitions against the 5 August measures. Interestingly, on 4 April 2018, the Supreme Court in its judgment on a petition against Article 370, upheld the provision ruling that

The foregoing steps would no doubt help pave the way for reengagement but reengagement should be taken as a means, not an end itself. Needless to emphasize that without settling the Kashmir dispute in a just manner, all efforts to build bridges of normal relations between the two archenemies are bound to crumble. Diplomacy despises slapdash approaches, and in mutual hostility there is barely any space for unilateral flexibility.

The question remains what would be the final contours of the Kashmir settlement. Should the two countries revert to the four-point formula as was being discussed between the two countries on the back channel from 2004 onwards? Do both countries now own those discussions and are ready to pick up from where the matters were left? Obviously, such sensitive issues cannot be discussed openly. It becomes counterproductive to publicly and prematurely move beyond stated positions on such tricky and vexed issues before final is reached at formal negotiations.

It would be foolhardy to expect quick results. However, almost fifty years have elapsed to the 1972 Shimla Agreement. Pakistan would find it very difficult to spend fifty more years in bilateral talks with no concrete results.

On the other hand, mutual concerns related to terrorism also need to be addressed effectively and conclusively. It could be expected that once the core dispute is amicably resolved it would become far easier to address the peripheral issues. In the wake of Kashmir settlement, positivity in all likeli hood will become self-sustaining

However, it must be pointed out that the growing US-China rivalry, and the Taliban’s return to power are also having serious bearings on Pakistan-India relations. Should India fully align itself with the US strategic objectives at both systemic and sub-systemic levels, prospects for bettering the situation in South Asia would further deflate? India cannot have its cake and eat it too. Suffice it to say for now that cooperation and confrontation do not and cannot coexist for very long.

Let us hope the two countries have learnt from their past mistakes, and are able to muster political courage to make a new beginning. They also have a responsibility towards posterity and the region as whole which remains the least integrated in the world.

Peace between the two will create myriad opportunities for South Asia and beyond. Are the two countries ready to tread a path that leads to peace and prosperity? Sadly, I am not hearing much to this effect in India. Ler’s remember that hubris is anathema to effective diplomacy.

If the past is any guide, avoiding to settle the Kashmir dispute upfront will keep the bilateral diplomacy in disarray and future relations rickety and unpredictable. The present stalemate must give way to an irreversible trajectory that leads to a permanent peace between the two countries.

Ambassador G. Rasool Baluch

After two-decades-long sustained and bloody struggle against foreign occupation, a swift and surprise victory by the Taliban in Afghanistan not only stunned the world but even the victor. Everyone was in deep disbelief at their achievement. In this struggle by the Taliban against foreign occupation, several of their colleagues were killed, wounded and taken as prisoners. Some of them are part of the leadership team which will govern Afghanistan. The Taliban have indeed snatched this victory from the most powerful military on the globe. Having entered Kabul on August 15 with the final departure of the last US soldier, Major General Chris Donahue, and the last diplomat, the US Charge de Affairs, Ross Wilson, one minute to midnight of August 31-a deadline set by the US President, Joe Biden-marked the formal end of 20 years of occupation of Afghanistan by the US and NATO forces. The freedom fighters turned into rulers overnight. But alas! they were totally ill-prepared for the new role as rulers. To govern a country of about 40 million, which has been at war for the past five decades from within as well as with outside forces, is no joke. The unbelievable melting of the US-backed Ashraf Ghani regime into thin air along with its over 300,000 strong security apparatus with billions of worth of state-of-the-art military arsenal-including most advanced helicopters, planes, hundreds of guns and drones- and hundreds of technocrats and senior officials, including the head of the Afghan Central Bank, has left a gaping governance gap. Filling this vacuum in the governance structure is the most urgent challenge that the Taliban rulers will have to respond to. The world is watching anxiously to see if the warriors can metamorph themselves into effective rulers and can set up a functioning government.

The Taliban announced an interim Government on Tuesday, September 7. The Taliban chief Mullah Haibatullah approved a 33-member cabinet dominated by “Afghan War Veterans,” which was to be led by Mullah Muhammad Hassan Akhund. The spokesman for the regime, Zabihullah Mujahid, while announcing the formation of the cabinet, hastened to add, “The cabinet is not complete it is just acting. We will try to take people from other parts of the country.” This assurance was most likely meant for an audience abroad. The world has made it clear to the Taliban that the international recognition of their de facto control of the country is dependent on three major conditions that the Taliban:

Filling the vacuum in the governance structure is the most urgent challenge for the Taliban rulers. 

  1. form an inclusive and a broad-based government giving representation to all segments and denominations of the Afghan society, including religious and ethnic minorities and women; 
  2. assure the world of respect for the human rights of women and minorities.
  3. to not allow their territory to be used by non-state actors, including the ISS -K, Al Qaeda, EITK, TTP.

The formation of the interim government was necessitated for creating a governance structure to prevent the war-ravaged country from sliding into anarchy and the reemergence of warlords and extremist groups reclaiming “no man’s lands.”

What is needed is for the Taliban to remove the yolk of the guerrilla struggle of yesteryears, organise themselves as a political force and, perhaps, consider forming a political identity by replacing “Taliban” with some Islamic nomenclature. They might actually become a trailblazer for an Islamic democratic political order in Afghanistan, which could bring sustainable peace and prosperity to this ethnically diverse country.

The freezing of Afghan funds by the US to the tune of over nine billion dollars as well as over four hundred million by the IMF could push the country to an economic collapse, even anarchy. This is neither in the interest of Afghanistan nor the world. If Afghanistan’s economic stranglehold is allowed to persist, it could result in the erosion of the authority of the Taliban government and lead to the rise of local militias, which have been temporarily eliminated. For now, they have gone into retreat in the face of Taliban blitzkrieg. According to UN survey, about 14 to 15 million Afghans (every one in three) are facing food insufficiency. There are two million Afghan children who remain malnourished.

The frozen funds could result in non-payment of salaries to civil servants; resulting in a further collapse of the delivery of services to the people. The economic freeze has had an immediate effect on the health sector, including hospitals, which are facing acute shortages of medicines and disposable equipment. The US and IMF must open channels of communication with the new government in Kabul to avert yet another humanitarian catastrophe.

Leaving Afghanistan alone or abandoning the unfortunate people of Afghanistan (for whom life has indeed been “brutal and short”) would be morally incorrect and politically disastrous. Afghans have a right to lead normal lives; away from hunger, disease and death. No doubt, the primary responsibility for good governance, including the delivery of essential services, health, education and the safety of life and property, lies on the shoulders of the new rulers now controlling Kabul. However, these Mujahidin Taliban have only practised guerrilla warfare and are not at all aware of the complex science of good governance, including efficient service delivery. The issue of service delivery in Afghanistan is much more complex due to its rugged topography, geographical spread and lack of any rudimentary physical infrastructure for the public services delivery.

The Taliban might muddle through in setting up some form of functional structure. However, in the meantime, millions of Afghan women, children and men could suffer. A timely engagement by the UN to respond to economic, governance and humanitarian challenges could help Afghanistan transition from a state of war to a functioning state, where other civil and human faculties, both intellectual and spiritual, blossom in a natural rhythm and harmony.

China, Russia, Pakistan, Iran and Qatar could also sponsor a resolution at the UN General Assembly; calling upon the world to unfreeze Afghan funds and rebuild Afghanistan under an UN-supervised body, which can help the Afghan government in creating governance structures and recruiting technocrats from Afghanistan and neighbouring countries. This would help fill up the gap of governance so that the suffering of the people could be reduced.

Ambassador Hasan Habib

In Pakistan’s neighborhood, Iran remains a country that is most difficult to understand. It is shrouded in the historic myth that in 1979 Revolution changed into a garb of religious nationalism. The situation is further complicated by its ambivalent relations with the US and neighboring Arab states. Though it does not trust Pakistan, Turkey and Afghanistan but this mistrust is not as deep-rooted as with its Arabs neighbors. Since the 1920s, the Iranian are deeply suspicious of the Wahhabi Islam practiced in their neighborhood. On the other hand, the unstable Arabs monarchies fear the growing influence and export of the Iranian revolution into their territory. Making understanding Iran is more difficult.

How can we understand Iran? Our understanding of this neighbor is essential. Good relations with it could provide strategic depth that Pakistan is denied on Fast and northwestern borders.

History

Let’s look into the Iranian past and try to understand its pattern of behavior. The imperial past is ingrained into the Iranian psyche and is the basis of its nationalism. It is steeped into great Persian empires, literature, culture, glorious past (pre-Islamic and Islamic) and whatnot. Iranians often complain that its neighbors do not accord due weightage to these while dealing with Iran. Partly it is true but new ground realities and phenomenal changes in post-WWII scenarios also play into region politics. 

Tomb of Cyrus the Great / An Iranian carpet with

hunting scenes. The Persian empire of antiquity has long played an important role in the region as an imperial power and later because of its strategic position and abundant natural resources, especially petroleum as a factor in colonial and superpower rivalries.

The country’s roots as a distinctive culture and society date to the Achaemenian period, which began in 550 BCE. From that time the region that is now Iran traditionally known as Persia has been influenced by waves of indigenous and foreign conquerors and immigrants. Persia’s conquest by the Muslim Arabs in the 7th century CE left the most lasting influence, as Iranian culture was all but completely subsumed under that of its conquerors.

An Iranian cultural renaissance in the late 8th century led to a reawakening of Persian literary culture, though the Persian language was now highly Arabized and native Persian Islamic dynasties began to appear with the rise of the Tahirids in the early 9th century. The region fell under waves of Persian, Turkish, and Mongol conquerors until the 16th-century rise of the Safavids, who introduced Shi ism as the official creed. Over the following centuries, under state patronage the Shi’i clergy, a synthesis was formed between Persian culture and Shi i Islam that with obscured boundaries that arc mutually supportive With the fall of the Safavids in 1736, rule passed into the hands of several short-lived dynasties leading to the rise of the Qajar in 1796. The Qajar rule was marked by the growing influence of the European powers in Iran’s internal affairs, and by the growing power of the clergy.

The country’s difficulties led to the ascent in 1925 of Reza Khan and the establishment of the Pallavi line. His ill-planned efforts  to moderrnize Iran led to widespread dissatisfaction leading to the final overthrow of this dynasty in 1979. The revolution ary change had a strange mix of elements; a parliamentary democracy embedded in the Islamic theocracy. As the sole Shii state in the world, Iran found itself embroiled in a long-term devastating war with Iraq, and the alleged support for international terrorism left it as a pariah state.

Cocept of Velayat-e-Faqih

The power structure of Iran’s government is explained through the concept of velayat-e faqih, as explained by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. This method gives, in the absence of the last Shiite Imam, political leadership has a lead role in the state. Khomeini was the first to adopt this and his authority as leader was enshrined in the Iranian constitution. The Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Khobregan), an institution composed of ulama, chooses the leader from among qualified Shi’i clergy on the basis of the candidate’s personal piety, expertise in Islamic law, and political acumen. The powers of the leader are extensive. He makes appointments in the military and Revolutionary Guards and other departments of civil and judiciary. He declares war and is the commander in chief of the armed forces. He sets the nation’s policy and has no fixed term of office. In June 1989, the Assembly of Experts elected Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the successor of Khomeini.

Shiite Concept of Following a Living Alim

The Shia Sharia asks Ummah to follow a living Religious Person (Marj-e-Taqlid) as the study/review of Islamic practices is a continual process and a must for all of God’s laws. It is believed that only a Grand Ayatollah can interpret the Qur’an with authority. This process of “Ijtihad” provides means to deal with modern issues in a religious manner. So the Shi’a clergy have much more authority in modern times than the Sunni Ulema. The follower is obliged to pay a third part of religious tax “Khoms” (1/5 of the value-added) to their Marj-e-Taqlid. These are a few. According to unconfirmed estimates, there are around 70 Marj-e-Taqlid in the world. But they have in turn appointed representatives in different communities to guide their followers. The 1/3 of Khoms collected is used for religious, education, and welfare purposes giving these Ulemas substantial powers over the community.

This creates a substantial power center in the Islamic Republic. The independent observers claim that there are multiple power centers in Iran that makes an approach for peace rather difficult. These centers compete and cooperate with each other on an issue-by-issue basis. Further complicating the situation.

Post-Revolution situation

Iran’s quest for economic independence, full employment, and a high standard of living remain a far dream. Since the Islamic revolution population has almost doubled and poor agriculture makes it a net importer of food. It remains dependent on petroleum and natural gas revenue but with international sanctions, it is an impossible task. Iran’s efforts to develop communication, transportation, manufacturing, and energy infrastructures and integrating its communication network with neighboring states has some success. Iran’s economy lags despite its intended move away from public control of the financial system Despite the election of reformists, no steps have been taken to reduce state control of the economy leading to privatization. The US sanctions have also continued to negatively impact Iran’s economy especially by restricting technology transfers. With Conservative hold on power, foreign investment has remained a contentious issue because past experience. Iran has rehabilitated its petroleum and mining sector.

In the post-1950s, industrial development has resulted in a wide range of manufactured commodities; such as automobiles, electric appliances, telecommunications equipment, industrial machinery, paper, rubber products, steel, food products, wood, and leather products, textiles, and pharmaceuticals. Iran is known throughout the world for its handwoven carpets are highly valued.

In Shah’s time 71.5 Rials equaled $1 but it declined sharply in the post-Islamic revolution period due to the flight of capital. It is estimated that some $ 30-40 were taken out of the country mainly to Gulf, Europe, Canada, and US. In the interbank called “market rate”, the value of the IR controlled by the Bank-e-Milli (Central Bank). The state has oil export earnings, and total banking controls to manage capital outflows. The IR is fairly low at the moment despite high oil prices. The chart below shows the value of Iranian Rial

 

Year

IR vs 1 US$

2000

8350

2002

8200

2004

8885

2006

9227

2008

9147

2010

10308

2012

10800

2014

25000

2016

33000

2020

42000

2021 May

42105

 

These are bank rates.the black market rates are often 20% higher 

Ayotollah Ali Khomeni, Rahbar/Ebrahim Raisi ,President

The Presidency

The president, who is elected by universal adult suffrage, heads the executive branch and must be a native-born Iranian Shi’i. This post was largely ceremonial until July 1989, when a national referendum approved a constitutional amendment that abolished the post of prime minister and vested greater authority in the president. The president selects the Council of Ministers for approval by the legislature. The president and his ministers are responsible for the day-to-day administration of the government and the implementation of laws enacted by the legislature.

The unicameral legislature is the 290-member Islamic Consultative Assembly called the Majles. Deputies are elected directly for four-year terms by universal adult suffrage and recognized religious and ethnic minorities have token representation in the legislature. The Majles enacts all legislation and, under extraordinary circumstances, may impeach the president with a two-thirds majority vote. The elections are to be held every four years, under the supervision of the Council of Guardians. Suffrage is universal, and the minimum voting age is 16. The political parties have a limited role and their key candidates are often not allowed to participate in the elections.

The Judiciary


The judiciary consists of a Supreme Court, a Supreme Judicial Council, and lower courts. The chief justice and the prosecutor general must be specialists in Shi’i canon law who have attained the status of mujtahid. Under the 1979 constitution, all judges must base their decisions on the Shari ah (Islamic law). In 1983 the Mailes revised the penal code and instituted a system that embraced the form and content of Islamic law. This code implemented a series of traditional punishments. Violent corporal punishments, including execution, are now the required form of chastisement for a wide range of crimes.

Security Apparatus

In the post-Iraq war, the Iranian military has been a formidable force. Since 1980, Iran has established programs to achieve self-sufficiency in weapons. In the late 1990s, it had achieved some success in the production of medium and intermediate-range missiles. Iran’s military manpower comes from conscription, and males are required to serve 21 months of military service. The Revolutionary Guards is the country’s elite military force. Due to sanctions, Iran has only a small air force and navy.

Reformist elements rose within the government during the last decade of the 20th century, opposed both to the ongoing rule of the clergy and to Iran’s continued political and economic isolation from the international community. These were overcome by State internally promoting Iranian nationalism and an anti-American ideology regionally.

Elections-2021

The 13th Presidential election held, on 18 June 2021, had the lowest turnout (49%) since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Ebrahim Raisi, the Chief Justice of Iran was declared the winner in a controversial election with the mass disqualification of popular candidates by the Guardian Council. It also had the highest share of protest blank, invalid, and lost votes (around 13%). The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei had earlier declared that protest voting was religiously forbidden (haraam). Due to the US sanctions Iran’s economy has been stagnant. It is giving rise to a sense of isolation and victimization among the educated class. The youth and the democracy aspiring middle class is fully disillusioned and have lost hope in the elections

Nature of Regime

The Iranian regime is strangely divided in its System. The two former Presidents were “moderates” and were undermined from within despite being earlier cleared by the due religious-conservative process. The current President Ebrahim Raisi, elected in June 2021 is closely attached/representative of the theocratic system. How can it impact the State’s dealing with US, EU, regional countries is hard to predict? But any hardline will bring in tougher sanctions making lives of common Iranian much worst.

Neighbors

The geography of Iran is not favorable. Iran has not a long history of good friendly relations with any of its neighbors. It had fought an 8-year war with Iraq. The relations are better presently but Iraqi masses remain suspicious of Iranian hegemony. Its relations with Afghanistan sways between extremes. Its lowest point was in September 1998 with Taliban capture Mazar Shariff and killing 9 Iranian Consulate staff. In fact, Iranian forces started bombardment of Afghan border and full scale was prevented only after Iranian President Khatami personally requested the Supreme Leader. President Khatami was of the view that war with Afghanistan had the potential to escalate into spilling out into a full regional conflict. Iran also maintains very cautious relations with Turkey. Iran’s relations with its Arab neighbors are openly hostile. Its dispute on islands (Abu Musa, Lesser Tunb, and Greater Tunb) that are claimed by UAE but controlled by Iran, since 1971, after with drawl of British forces from Bahrain.

With Trump’s arrival in power, the Qatar crisis, and the emerging regional polarization, the relations between Iran and the UAE suffered a relations between Iran and the UAE suffered a serious setback. In the new situation, UAE’s and Saudi Arabia started joint efforts to curb Iran’s influence in the region. UAE at the 73rd session of the UN’s General Assembly reiterated the demand for its sovereignty over its three islands and accused Iran of occupying them for 47 years. In the Qatar crisis, Iran openly supported Qatar against Saudi Arabia. This and proxy wars in Syria and Yemen were seen as Iran’s emerging anti-US role in regional affairs.

Relations with Pakistan are very sticky. The Sunni Baluch’s anti-Iranian activities, sectarian killings in Pakistan, CPEC, human smuggling, oil smuggling to name a few are hurdles towards developing good relations between two Muslim neighbors. Indian hand cannot be ruled out in certain events in souring Iran-Pakistan relations.

Conclusion

Given the nature of the society and the strength of State Apparatus, change in the Iranian society is rather difficult. Since 1979, external factors especially forces led by the US has failed to dent the authority of the clergy. The centripetal forces of fear and nationalism have held fast in the country. The expected collapse from the poor economic performance of the regime has not yet happened. Iran’s role in the region will be emboldened with the apparent entry of Russia in the Middle East. The disorderly departure of the US from Afghanistan further strengthens the Iranian role in the region. Only some serious civil-military personality(s) clash could trigger an implosion in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This could only happen when a lack of resources brought forward contestants. That is unlikely to happen soon especially as the oil and gas prices are seeing an upswing.

DR JAMEEL AHMED KHAN

The United States in its  psychological delusion is not prepared to accept its waning influence and fiascos in Iraq, Syria, Libya but essentially in Afghanistan. The denial is casting impression of confusion that whether the US still has the same priorities or is changing the course. It certainly wants to retain influence in Taiwan, increase its military prowess and also keep pressure on Ukraine. At the moment, China, Russia together have started increasing an edge over the US in global theatre mostly in strategic and economic sphere.

On a regional level, Russia is gradually trying to gain a foothold, unlike America. In the evolving regional scenario, Israel’s presence cannot be ignored due to its full patronage of the United States. The dynamics of regional and global politics are changing so rapidly that the states are busy reviewing fast changing situation for frequently prioritizing foreign policy alignment. 

The US and NATO forces are increasing pressure on Ukraine against Russian dominance. However, the fact remains that Russia cannot withdraw from: Ukraine or else NATO forces will take control and install their missiles systems. This will threaten Russian national security and consequently impact regional peace.

The United States, on the other hand, is trying to gain a foothold by strengthening Taiwan in order to achieve its goal of containing China’s growing influence. A recent example is the US-Australia-UK military agreement which raises alarm threatening the regional peace. The military pact is an attempt to reduce the role of China by proliferating nuclear weapon in the region i.e. nuclear powered submarines and equipment 

Under these circumstances ,China will have no choice but to increase its competitive strength to thwart possible misadventure by United States and its allies

The ‘Quad’, which also includes India, is a part of wider US alliance which apparently aims to promote trade and economic cooperation but tantamount to military ploy.

The US has also accused Iran of recently shooting down a drone in the Gulf region and consolidating its position. The US has the potential to target the rest of the regional countries in the process of ferocious china containment policy.

Recently an Iranian oil tanker was attacked by five boats in which 9 people were reported to have been killed. Tran suspects the United States for the attack. Given the current situation, it seems that if the nuclear negotiations keep facing stumbling blocks & US sanctions persists, Iran has the option to mobilize its sleeper cells in the region and target the opposing forces and the installations.

In the emerging political and military maneuvering in the region, Pakistan will have to understand the sequels if the United States attempts to invade or occupy Chabahar in its endeavor to gain strategic influence in Afghanistan and mount surveillance on Iran and beyond. In such a situation, it would directly affect Gwadar port; an epicenter of CPEC and a vital component of belt and road initiative. Obviously, if this happens, Chinese will not remain silent rather it could retaliate with full military might, Pakistan, in such a scenario, may be caught between two giants in case of any misadventure resulting in huge consequences. We have to adopt multi-faceted and multi-dimensional diplomacy in order to avert or at least minimize possible harm detrimental to our national interest.

Ambassador M.Alam Brohi

The Nation states are tempted to create wars and try to win them for self-serving political and economic interests in flagrant disregard of the implications and consequences their adventures entail. With the technologically developed weapons of war, the regional and international conflicts cause more deaths, destruction, poverty, pestilence and displacement of people.

Our world is full of conflicts with many war zones. The growing socio-economic grievances, ethno-religious nationalism and populism that have crept in many a society have resulted in the killing of hundreds of thousands and displacement of millions as witnessed in Rwanda in the past and being seen in Myanmar and India today. The countries that have suffered most by ethnic, economic, sectarian and political conflicts in recent years in Africa are Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Angola, Sudan, and Somalia. The presence of local IS-K and Al Qaeda in many of these countries is an open secret.

In the Middle East, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt have witnessed turmoil in the post 2011 period. Yemen, ravaged by rivalry between two Muslim states has already claimed more than 100,000 lives. Ever since the overthrow and brutal murder of Qaddafi, Libya is split into two parallel administrative units with raging tribal clashes abet ted by at least four Muslim countries. Syria has suffered loss of over 400,000 and displacement of millions since so called Arab Spring The persisting tension between Iran, Arab states and Israel on one hand, and the US and Iran on the other following the former’s unilateral withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement and the imposition of heavy sanctions on Tehran keeps the cauldron boiling in the Middle. Israel’s military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities and within Lebanon, Syria and Palestine keep stoking the fire.

Seven million people of the oil-rich Venezuela are living under crushing poverty. The country is hamstrung by two governments resulting from controversial elections and supported by rival powerful states. Ukraine is caught in the crosshair of rivalry between the West and Russia. There is strong possibility of the spillover of these conflicts particularly when no lasting solution to these conflicts seems to be in sight.

The callous, unjust and provocative steps taken by India on August 5, 2019 altering the status of Jammu and Kashmir turning the entire valley into an open dungeon, and India’s current plans to change the demographic balance within the only Muslim majority region under its illegal occupation have increased the likelihood of a dangerous military conflagration between the two nuclear states of the region. The territorial dispute between India and China further escalates military tension in the region.

The military tensions within the South East Asia particularly in Taiwan and South China Sea pose perennial threats to international peace and security We can add to this the fast short range ballistic missile tests, the ongoing US-North Korea dead lock and the Sino-US competition and confrontation giving an impetus to QUAD’s strategic exercises in the Asia-Pacific region. The current precarious situation in Afghanistan carrying the seeds of multidimensional crisis including poverty, hunger, mass displacement of population, civil strife, anarchy, growth of terrorism, escalation of regional and international conflicts, appropriately exposes the callous policy of the US-led west towards the innocent people of Afghanistan more than the Taliban regime.

The recent diplomatic initiatives witnessed in Moscow, Tehran, New Delhi and Islamabad have failed to reach consensus to positively engage the Taliban in the region with a view to influencing their future policies by political mainstreaming, economic connectivity and strategic cooperation. The release of Afghanistan’s assets continues to be precariously hung on how the Taliban regime behaves.

The US and its allies are hoping to enhance their leverage on the besieged rulers of Kabul. But they too are striking a severe blow to the Taliban’s ability to stem the growing strength of ferocious IS-K in the country which, as testified by senior US officials to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, can acquire the capacity to pose threats to their assets within 6-12 months.

The IS-K is an affiliate of the former Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – ISIS or Daesh consisting of its remnants. After its mother organization was cracked down by the US, the IS-K found a new sanctuary in Afghanistan with the abetment of militant groups including the TTP and Arab, Uzbek and Uighur remnants of Al-Qaeda under the nose of the strong US intelligence network and the Afghan National Security Forces.

The world has witnessed the militant prowess of IS-K. During the chaotic withdrawal of US from Afghanistan, the IS-K, in a deadly suicide bombing near the Kabul airport, killed over 170 Afghans and 13 US soldiers. Since August to this day, IS-K has carried out over 60 attacks on Shia mosques and hospitals. As late as November 2, it attacked the Kabul’s military hospital killing 25 people including a senior commander of the Taliban namely Hamadullah Rahmani. Its recent attacks in other cities have killed scores of innocent people. Emboldened by the ambivalent US policy towards the Taliban regime, IS-K has reportedly intensified efforts to strengthen its ranks by enlisting the disgruntled elements of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Baluchistan Liberation Army, East Turkestan Islamic Movement, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Afghan national army and panjsheri insurgents. Notwithstanding this, the US refuses to release Afghanistan’s assets.

This raises many pertinent questions about the designs of US and its allies. The US is mounting pressure on Taliban to accede to its demand for “over the horizon” facility for air lording and monitoring the militant’s movement. The Taliban have been resisting US demand for the simple reason that it violates their country’s sovereignty.

Apparently, the ‘over the horizon’ facility would serve multi purposes other than monitoring and attacking the militant organizations. It would facilitate the US strategic leverage against Iran, China and the Central Asian region where the West is wary of the growing Chinese and Russian ingress. Interestingly, the IS-K is not listed with the US as an entity of particular concern whereas the Taliban are very much on such list. One can well imagine the US policy on IS-K. Would the US use this militant group as an instrument of policy to keep Taliban under pressure, embarrass China in Xinjiang, Pakistan in its province of Baluchistan and Iran through IS-K affiliates? To me, it seems so to the utmost peril of the regional states.

Mr. Najmus Saqib (Dr. Salim Ahmed)

Passionate for botanical medicine, nature healing practices and keen interest in the teachings of Hahnemann and PrieBnitz, the medical practitioner Dr. Heinrich Reckeweg(1877-1944),discovered that for diseases and medical  conditions always taking the same course time and again – the choice fell on the same classical homoeopathic remedies. He ran tests to mix those remedies individually for each patient thus reaching the conclusion that for certain disease patterns again and again the same combinations of homoeopathic remedies showed good effects. This was the hour of founding of the homeopathic combination remedies, back then called complexes.

Dr. Reckeweg founded in 1947, always remained committed to combining traditional production methods and state-of-the-art technology. Even in its fourth generation, the name “Reckeweg” continues to stand for trust, quality and research as our mission is to produce effective and well tolerated homoeopathic medicines in a responsible way. Traditional production methods such as manual shaking or potentiation combined with modern technology, along with ambitious fundamental research, unwavering quality and highly qualified staff are the distinguishing features of Dr. Reckeweg.

At Dr. Reckeweg, potentiation or manual shaking the decisive production step solely applied in homeopathy is a central pillar of homeopathic production. During the manual shaking process high- and low-pressure zones are dynamically created before immediately cancelling each other out which results in an immense context surface. We have consciously chosen to not use machines to support the process based on Hahnemann’s multi-vessel system. This results in high quality products made strictly with the prescribed Homoeopathic guidelines.

Our track record for developing homoeopathic combination remedies on the basis of our own research has made us a reliable choice for therapists, patients and consumers around the world.

Our products are available in over 40 countries, approved by international regulatory bodies including FDA. In Dr. Reckeweg’s department for basic research, scientists pursue the general principles of homoeopathy as a therapy procedure as well as evidences regarding the effectiveness of Dr. Reckeweg remedies. The department accolades consist of nearly a dozen projects over the past 20 years, work documented impressively in several books and dozens of publications.

The high-quality of Homoeopathic medicines from Dr. Reckeweg Germany is the result of a strict selection of raw materials, a manufacturing process that meets today’s national and international requirements without sacrificing well-established traditions.

Our medicines are produced strictly according to the GMP guidelines. Chemical, physico-chemical, microbiological and pharmacognostic analyses are part of routine quality control of the starting materials. It includes testing of purity, identity and content as well as the determination of physical parameters. Various Homoeopathic pharmacopoeias including the; German and European pharmacopoeias, the Pharmacopoeia of the United States are also rigidly adhered to.

In Pakistan, Dr. Reckeweg first set foot in 1975 with Dr. Salim Ahmed & Co being their authorized representative. The company’s founder, Late Dr. Salim Ahmed’s hard work, dedication and wide expertise in Homoeopathy transformed Dr. Rechweg and Co GmbH into one of Pakistan’s leading  Homoeopathic brands. It is our promise to always do our best. Our passion for Homoeopathy and products in what sets us apart.